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Abstract
While the labor share of income has decreased in most advanced
economies since the 1980s, it has remained relatively stable in Switzer-
land. However, this does not imply that the capital share of income
has also remained stable. Our results suggest that the share of imputed
capital rental payments to income has decreased. Similar to other coun-
tries, Switzerland has seen an increase in the so-called factorless income
share that cannot be readily attributed to capital and labor. The in-
crease in factorless income may reflect a rise in economic rents, higher
compensation for business risks, or increased compensation for unmea-
sured input factors, especially intangible capital. We find that the stable
labor share in Switzerland cannot be traced back to high wage growth,
but rather to subdued investment growth and a high growth rate of the
labor force.
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1 Introduction
In recent decades, the labor share of income - that is, the proportion of
national income that is paid to workers - has been declining in many advanced
economies (International Labour Organization, 2015). The decline of the
labor share has often been interpreted as implying an increase in the capital
share. Recent studies, however, find that the fall in the labor share has
not been offset by an expansion in the capital share (see, for example,
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) or Barkai (2016)). Barkai (2016) suggests
that the decrease of both the capital share and labor share has been offset
by an increase in a residual that may comprise compensations to other factor
inputs. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2018) interpret this residual as factorless
income. This factorless income may include unmeasured returns to intangible
capital, risk compensation, or precautionary corporate savings in addition to
profits.
We aim to provide estimates for the evolution of the Swiss capital and factor-
less income shares since the 1990s. Recent studies propose methodologies to
compute income shares for capital in a narrow sense, and one for factorless
income or capital in a broader sense (Barkai, 2016; Karabarbounis and
Neiman, 2018). When calculating the capital share, the selection of the model
and the assumptions used to calculate it are crucial since the methodology to
estimate the required rate of return largely determines changes in the capital
share. Barkai (2016) used market prices to compute the cost of capital, thus
allowing for changes in the required rate of return. We follow this approach
to derive the required rate of return and capital costs, which are then used
to calculate the capital share of income and the share of the residual that
may - as discussed above - include profits or an unmeasured compensation for
intangible capital.
Our findings suggest that the Swiss capital and factorless income shares have
substantially changed since the 1990s. The calculations show that imputed
capital rental payments have fallen considerably. Since the capital stock
has not increased enough to compensate for the drop in the required rate
of return, the capital share has substantially decreased since 1991. This
decline has been offset by an increase in the share of factorless income.
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We then focus on the mechanisms that could explain the development of
factor shares since the beginning of the 1990s. While the Swiss labor share
has remained rather stable over the past several decades according to data
and studies available (see, also Cho et al. (2017); OECD (2018)), this does
not imply that Swiss workers have experienced higher wage growth than
workers in other advanced economies. The constancy of the Swiss labor share
rather reflects weak investment growth and a considerable increase in the
Swiss labor force, which has resulted in a decline in the capital-to-output ratio.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide
an overview of the current literature on the labor and capital shares and the
impact of the changes in factor shares. In section 3, we present the model
that is used to calculate the capital and factorless income shares. This is
followed in section 4 by an overview and short analysis of the data for the
Swiss economy. In section 5, the results of our computations of the required
rate of return, capital share, and factorless income since the beginning of the
1990s are presented and discussed. Finally, section 6 contains the conclusions.
2 Literature Review
In most advanced economies, the labor share of income had remained remark-
ably constant until the 1980s. However, in the last few decades, a continuous
decline has been observed by many authors (see, for example, Karabarbounis
and Neiman (2013)).1 At the same time, technological progress has had a
strong impact on many economies; and this is giving rise to questions about the
consequences and implications for the future (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014).
In the literature, a variety of explanations and triggers for the fall in the labor
share have been presented (see, for instance, Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003);
Elsby et al. (2013); Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013); Dorn et al. (2017);
Dao et al. (2017)). These explanations include a decrease in the relative
price of investment goods relative to consumption goods, globalization and
international trade, increasing concentration and the rise of superstar firms,
1However, one should stress that there are various measurement issues related to the
computation of the labor share. The use of alternative measures may considerably affect
the strength of the decline in the labor share, and even the existence of a decline for some
countries. For an overview, see, e.g., Cho et al. (2017).
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an increase in market power, changes in the capital-output ratio, productivity
growth outpacing wage growth, and changes in the bargaining power of
employees.
Many of these possible drivers are related to technological change. According
to Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013), technological progress has decreased
the relative cost of capital leading to an increase in capital intensity. They
find that economies experiencing a higher decrease in prices of investment
goods were also affected by a more substantial contraction in the labor
share. Furthermore, there is evidence that the decline is due to changes
within sectors rather than shifts in the economic structure (see, for example,
Rodriguez and Jayadev (2010); Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013)).
Elsby et al. (2013) note that the relative prices hypothesis cannot fully explain
the decline in the labor share in the United States. They find that when the
labor share faced the most substantial decline there was no acceleration in the
growth rate of capital stock, but also that in the same period wages and labor
productivity were stagnating. Furthermore, at the industry level, increased
imports had adverse effects on the industry-level labor share.
The International Labour Organization (2015) focuses on the development
of wages and labor productivity to explain the change in labor share. When
labor productivity grows faster than wages, the labor share decreases. The
International Labour Organization argues that this played a role in the
declining labor share in several developed nations; however, this trend has not
been observed across all industries.
In the context of technological change, the rise of so-called superstar firms has
also been discussed in the literature (Dorn et al. (2017)). New technologies
such as the Internet might have disproportionally fostered the emergence
of these superstar firms and increased their market share, leading to higher
concentration. Dorn et al. (2017) note that since these firms are bigger, more
prosperous, and more productive, they will have a lower labor share; and
conclude that the total labor share decreases as these firms expand.
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) provide another hypothesis that allows
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for changes in market power. They study the link between the capital and
labor shares and conclude that when markups are constant, a decrease in the
labor share will result in a one-to-one increase in the capital share. However,
Karabarbounis and Neiman find that the capital share has not increased
enough to compensate for the decline in the labor share, and in many
countries, both the capital and labor share have decreased, thus, providing
some evidence that markups might have increased.
Barkai (2016) presents similar results. He calculates the capital share for
the United States using three different specifications of the required rate of
return. He finds a 20 to 30 percent decline in capital share, which is even
more substantial than the decrease in the labor share. He concludes that the
only explanation for a simultaneous contraction in both the labor share and
capital share would be an increase in markup since a decrease in the labor
share brought by changes in relative prices, technology, and preferences would
lead to a one-to-one increase in the capital share. More specifically, Barkai
notes that changes in relative prices, technology or preferences cause the
labor share to decrease (increase) and the capital share to increase (decrease)
by the same proportion. By contrast, if the decline of the labor share is not
entirely offset by an increase in the capital share, but mostly by an increase
in the profit share (what we call more broadly factorless income share), then
a combination of changes in preferences, production technology, or relative
prices as well as competition might have caused the shift (Barkai, 2016).
How the labor share and capital share respond to an increase in factorless in-
come depends on the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs; namely,
to what extent capital can substitute labor. To give an illustration, under the
assumption of a unitary elasticity of substitution, when the capital-to-output
ratio increases, the rate of return to capital declines by the same amount, thus
capital share remain constant (Piketty, 2017). If the elasticity of substitution
is smaller (larger) than one, then the share of the factor that becomes more
abundant will decrease (increase) (Romer, 2012). In other words, if the elas-
ticity of substitution is smaller than one, an increase in the capital-to-output
ratio causes the rate of return to capital to fall more strongly, which implies a
decrease in the capital share (Piketty, 2017). However, Piketty (2017), argues
that in the data, a relative increase in capital leads to a decrease in the la-
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bor share, which would suggest an elasticity of substitution greater than one.
However, most studies find an elasticity of substitution below one (Alvarez-
Cuadrado et al., 2017), although there is still an intense debate and estimates
range from largely smaller than unity (Antras, 2004; Klump et al., 2007), unity
(Balistreri et al., 2003), to larger than one (Piketty, 2017; Karabarbounis and
Neiman, 2013).
Changes in factor shares can have considerable welfare implications as they
determine how income is divided among factors of production. Karabarbounis
and Neiman (2013) explain that the repercussions are conditional on the
root causes of the changes. They estimated the effect of different shocks in
two distinct economies; one characterized by a Cobb-Douglas production
function, and the other by a CES production function with an elasticity of
substitution of 1.25. By construction, a decrease in the relative prices of
investment goods has an effect on capital and labor shares only in the CES
economy. Karabarbounis and Neiman illustrate that the labor share decreases
at the expense of the capital share whereas consumption, investment, and
GDP increase. Thus, overall there are substantial positive welfare effects. By
contrast, an increase in markup decreases the labor and capital shares and
leads to a rise in the factorless income share in both economies; consequently,
consumption, investment, GDP, and welfare decrease (Karabarbounis and
Neiman, 2013).
The International Labour Organization (2015) notes that a lower labor share,
which implies lower labor costs, could allow for more productive investments,
which could lead to higher employment rate. However, this outcome has
not materialized. On the contrary, the so-called factorless income share -
often interpreted as profits - has increased, and this shift has not led to
higher investment rates. Possible explanations are an over-proportional
expansion in profit in the financial and other sectors and the weak aggregate
demand for productive investments (International Labour Organization, 2015).
Despite the possibility that the effect of the change in factor shares could
eventually increase efficiency, not every individual will necessarily be better
off. The consequences of the trend for the different segments of a society are
more complex. According to Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013), if individu-
als are endowed with a different set of skills that have a different elasticity of
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substitution with capital, the decline in labor share could influence the income
distribution. Furthermore, Piketty (2017) and the International Labour Or-
ganization (2015) note that if capital share increases, inequality is also likely
to grow, as capital is over proportionately distributed at the top of society.
Addionally, as a consequence of the contraction in the labor share, households
could be excluded from the gains of economic growth, thus leading to a higher
polarization of society (International Labour Organization, 2015). It is, there-
fore, crucial to understand the dynamic behind changes in factor shares to
correctly assess possible consequences and, if necessary, intervene efficiently.
3 The Model
This section discusses the model used to derive the capital and factorless in-
come share. The derivation heavily draws from Barkai (2016). To calculate
the capital share, a specification for the required rate of return is needed.2 Like
Barkai (2016), we use the following specification for the required rate of return
on capital, which assumes that capital investment is financed by borrowing.
Rs = i
D − E[pis] + δs (1)
Where Rs is the required rate of return on capital of type s, i
D is the cost of
debt borrowing in the financial market, E[pis] is the expected inflation rate on
capital of type s, and δs is the depreciation rate on the specific capital type.
Capital costs of the capital of type s, Es, are equal to the required rate of
return on assets of type s, Rs, multiplied by the quantity of capital of type s,
Ks, and the price of capital of type s, P
K
s
Es = RsP
K
s Ks (2)
where PKs Ks is the capital stock of type s at current prices. Aggregate capital
costs, E, are the sum of all capital costs over all different types of capital.
E =
∑
s
RsP
K
s Ks (3)
The aggregate required rate of return, R, is computed as a weighted average
of the required rate of return on capital for all the different types of assets.
R =
∑
s
PKs Ks∑
j P
K
j Kj
Rs (4)
2The required rate of return is defined as the minimum rate of return on investment
necessary to make it acceptable to a business (Hashimzade et al., 2017).
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By inserting equation (6) in (5) capital costs can be written as
E =
∑
s
RsP
K
s Ks =
∑
s
PKs Ks∑
j P
K
j Kj
Rs ·
∑
s
PKs Ks (5)
The capital share, SK , is defined as the share of total capital costs,∑
sRsP
K
s Ks, in nominal gross value added, P
Y Y .
SK =
∑
sRsP
K
s Ks
P Y Y
(6)
Similarly, labor share, SL, is the share of total labor costs in nominal gross
value added, P Y Y .
SL =
wL
P Y Y
(7)
Where w is the wage level, and L is the labor input.
Gross value added is defined as the value of gross output less intermediate
input (Rognlie, 2016). By making similar assumptions as Barkai (2016) we
specify the nominal gross value added in year t as
P Yt Yt = wtLt +RtPt−1Kt + Πt (8)
where wtLt is the labor expenditure in year t, RtPt−1Kt is the nominal capital
cost in year t, and Πt is nominal factorless income. Diving equation (8) by the
gross value added, P Yt Yt, gives
1 = SLt + S
K
t + S
Π
t (9)
where SΠt is the factorless income share in year t. Thus, it must hold that the
sum of the capital, labor and factorless income shares equals one. Similarly
to Barkai (2016) the capital and factorless income shares in gross value added
are calculated without considering taxes on production and import as well
as subsidies. Thus, once the capital share has been calculated, the factorless
income share is computed as a residual, namely everything that is neither
allocated to capital nor to labor.
4 Data
Two different time series containing labor share are used. The Penn World
Table (henceforward PWT) provides different specifications some of which also
include mixed-income.3 We chose the specification that splits mixed-income
3Mixed Income is defined as the total earnings of self-employed (Inklaar and Timmer,
2013). For more information see Feenstra et al. (2017) and Inklaar and Timmer (2013).
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Figure 1: Labor Share (Source: See Section 4 and Appendix A.)
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between capital and labor in the same fraction as the economy as a whole.
Thus, the labor share is calculated as the share of labor compensation,
including part of mixed-income, in GDP at current national prices. The
second series containing the labor share is taken from the OECD and is
computed by diving labor costs by nominal GDP. The series of OECD include
yearly data from 1986 until 2012, although the first four observations are
estimated, and the series of the PWT covers the period 1986-2014 where data
for the years 1986-1994, and 2013-2014 are estimated. Since we calculate
the factor income shares in gross value added, we rescaled the labor share series.
As it is possible to see in Figure 1, the two series exhibit some differences.
The specification of the PWT is slightly higher; however, the series converge
over time. The labor share of the OECD tends to increase slightly while the
one of the PWT had been decreasing marginally. Overall, it can be seen that
the labor share in gross value added remained quite stable over time.
Data on the nominal and real net non-financial capital stock are taken from
the Federal Statistical Office (henceforward FSO). These series includes yearly
data on the net non-financial capital stock, including residential buildings in
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Figure 2: Nominal Capital Stock in million CHF (Source: See Section 4 and
Appendix A.)
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million of CHF from 1990 to 2016 as well as the relative capital stock for nine
different types of capital.4 Rudolf and Zurlinden (2009) provide the share
of residential buildings in capital stock, which we used to remove residential
buildings from the net non-financial capital stock. The development of
nominal capital stock (excluding residential buildings) is illustrated in Figure
2. The capital stock has been growing quite steadily with some exceptions
during economic downturns, during which, it stagnated.
The Consumer Price Index is taken from the FSO, while real and nominal
GDP, as well as the GDP deflator, come from the State Secretariat for
Economic Affairs (henceforward SECO), and gross value added from the
Statistic Division of the United Nations.
Unfortunately, we were not able to find a series for the investment deflator
since 1990. For this reason and given the critical role played by capital
inflation in the model, we use three different specifications. For the first
specification, a price index of capital stock is constructed for the period
1990-2016 by dividing nominal by real capital stock using the capital data
of the FSO. For the second one, we took the price index for capital goods
from the producer and import prices statistic of the Swiss National Bank
4The different types of capital are buildings, civil engineering, transport equipment, other
machinery and equipment (incl. Weapons systems), computer, electronic and optical prod-
ucts, electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c, products of agriculture, forestry, fisheries
and aquaculture, research and development, and computer and related services.
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Figure 3: Expected Inflation (Source: See Section 4 and Appendix A.)
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(henceforward SNB). This statistic is available only from May 1993, and
since we are working with yearly data, and the series are already short,
inflation for 1993 is kept as the average of the available months. For the
third specification, an asset-specific investment deflator is combined with the
share of that asset in total investment; both taken from the capital detail
of the PWT. These series are used to create an asset specific inflation rates,
and then aggregate capital inflation is formed by taking the weighted average
based on the composition of capital formation. In this way, it was possible to
build capital inflation for the period 1990-2014.
Following Barkai (2016), we construct expected inflation as the three-year
moving average of the inflation rates. Inflation is computed as the log-
difference of the respective price indices.5
Figure 3 shows the three different specifications of expected capital inflation
as well as expected CPI inflation. The specification calculated using the
data from the PTW and the one calculated with the capital stock of the
FSO seem to move in parallel for most of the time, while the one retrieved
from the SNB is smoother. Additionally, it is possible to notice that at the
end of the sample, the series move in different directions. Overall, it can be
seen that expected capital inflation fluctuate more than expected consumer
5Note that the second and third capital price indices are calculated on investment while
the first one is calculated on capital stock.
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Figure 4: Depreciation Rate (Source: See Section 4 and Appendix A.)
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Figure 5: Cost of Capital (Source: See Section 4 and Appendix A, own calcu-
lations.)
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The cost of capital is defined as the yield on Moody’s Aaa corporate bond portfolio minus
the US risk free rate plus the Swiss risk free rate.
inflation. Moreover, it is important to notice that expected capital inflation
was negative for many years in the mid-1990s.
The depreciation rate of the capital stock is taken from the PWT. As shown
in Figure 4, the depreciation rate remained quite stable over over the decades.
Barkai (2016) defined the debt costs of capital as the yield on Moody’s Aaa
corporate bond portfolio. Since we are calculating the capital share for Switzer-
land, it would be more appropriate to use the yield on a Swiss corporate bond
portfolio. Unfortunately, we were not able to find a suitable series; thus we
construct the debt cost of capital by subtracting the risk free rate of the United
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Figure 6: Required Rate of Return (Source: See Section 4 and Appendix A,
own calculations.)
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States and adding the Swiss one to the yield on Moody’s Aaa corporate bond
portfolio. As shown in Figure 5 the cost of capital has been decreasing sharply
since 1990. Data on the yield of Moody’s Aaa corporate bonds as well as US 10
years Treasury and Swiss 10 year government bonds are taken from the FRED
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Other series relevant for the analysis and
discussion of the results such as data on productivity, employment in full-time
equivalent as well as wage growth are taken from the FSO. A detailed overview
of the sources of the data is available in Appendix A, Table 2.
5 Results
This section presents the results of the specification calculated using expected
capital inflation of the FSO. Using the other specifications leads to similar
findings, and all results, as well as explanations of all specifications, are
presented in the appendix, Table 3 and 4. The results are approximated by a
linear time trend, derived from an OLS regression of the estimated series on
time. The estimated changes are calculated on the fitted values. For instance,
the percentage point change is defined as Yˆt − Yˆ1 and the percentage change
is defined as Yˆt−Yˆ1
Yˆ1
, where Yt is the last observation of variable Y and Y1 is the
first one.
Figure 6 shows the calculated required rate of return from 1991 to 2014. The
required rate of return contracted by 5.69 percentage points (45.10 percent).
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Figure 7: Capital Share (Source: See Section 4 and Appendix A, own calcula-
tions.)
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During this period, the average expected capital inflation was low, on average
0.38 percent. Given that the depreciation rate remained quite stable, and
that the cost of capital iD decreased sharply, the required rate of return
diminished. Of the three variables used to calculate the required rate of
return, the substantial decrease in the cost of capital is what drove down the
required rate of return.
Figure 7 shows the evolution of the capital share from 1991 to 2014. The
fitted capital share dropped by 12.12 percentage points (51.0 percent), which
means that the capital stock in Switzerland has not increased enough to
compensate for the sharp decline in the required rate of return.
Given that the labor share remained constant, and that the capital share
and capital costs decreased, factorless incomes must have expanded. As
illustrated in Figure 8, the factorless income share derived from our model
has substantially increased over the past decades. With the labor share of
the OECD, the increment of the factorless income share was 9.60 percentage
points (87.27 percent) between 1991 and 2012, while with the labor share data
from the PTW the increase was of approximately 13.38 percentage points
(186.69 percent) from 1991 to 2014. These results are similar to those that
Barkai (2016) found for the United States. In Figure 8, it is possible to see
a marked shock during the financial crisis when the factorless income share
dramatically contracted. For the capital and labor shares, the opposite is
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Figure 8: Factorless Income Share (Source: See Section 4 and Appendix A,
own calculations.)
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true. The labor and capital shares tend to expand during recessions, while
factorless incomes as a share of gross value added are squeezed.
What might explain our results? As illustrated in Figure 9, the capital-
to-labor ratio expanded rapidly between 1991 and 1998, but has remained
stable since then.6 While labor input has considerably increased (mainly
because of high immigration), capital investment has remained subdued. In
the wake of these developments, the capital-to-output ratio even decreased
during the period under consideration. Thus, the Swiss economy experienced
a period of weak capital deepening. A shift from labor to capital is not
visible even though the relative price of investment has decreased in the
past decades (Figure 10). Weak investment has contributed to low labor
6Labor input is defined as labor in full-time equivalent. Note that labor input for the
year 1991 is calculated as the average of the last two quarters.
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Figure 9: The Evolution of Capital and Labor (Source: See Section 4 and
Appendix A.)
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productivity growth in Switzerland, which has been even lower than in many
other advanced economies (OECD (2017)). According to data from the
Federal Statistical Office, average yearly labor productivity growth between
1996 and 2015 was only one percent. Interestingly, real wage growth has been
even lower at 0.6 percent. Potential explanations for these developments are
the subdued capital deepening and a lack of competition, in particular in the
services sector. For instance, the findings of Fo¨llmi et al. (2018) and OECD
(2017) imply that a higher degree of competition in the services sector might
increase productivity. In addition, trade openness can be expected to increase
labor productivity through different channels; namely know-how diffusion,
specialization, and capital deepening. According to Fo¨llmi et al., the Swiss
services sector is characterized by above OECD average trade restrictions and
regulatory impediments to competition. Furthermore, the strong presence of
the state in some sectors also affects productivity.
There are, interestingly, two sectors that stand out in terms of productivity
growth. Between 1996 and 2015 average productivity growth in the chemical
and pharmaceutical sectors was 4.3 and 5.7 percent, respectively. According to
BAK Basel Economics (2015), productivity in the pharmaceutical industry in
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Figure 10: Relative Prices (Source: See Section 4 and Appendix A.)
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Base year: 2016 = 100. Relative prices are defined as the ratio of investment prices relative
to consumer prices.
2014 was 4 times higher than in the economy as a whole. High innovation and
investment, especially in research and development, as well as high efficiency
are the reasons for this performance. In the absence of this performance of
the pharmaceutical and chemical sectors, one might have seen a decline in the
Swiss capital-to-labor ratio.
Overall, our findings suggest that the constancy of the Swiss labor share
should not be explained by factors such as the high skill level of the labor force
or high labor productivity, but by both weak aggregate investment growth
and increases in the labor force. A decrease in competition could potentially
explain relatively weak labor productivity growth, subdued investments, and
the increase in the factorless income share (in particular, profits).
6 Conclusion
We used the model of Barkai (2016) to calculate the capital and factorless
income shares of Switzerland. Similarly to Barkai (2016), we find a sharp
decline in the required rate of return. The capital stock in Switzerland did
not grow enough to compensate for the drop and caused the capital share to
fall significantly. Given the constancy of the labor share, a contraction in the
capital share led to an increase in the factorless income share. Our findings
suggests that the constancy of the Swiss labor share is not the consequence of
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high wage growth but rather the results of weak investment growth combined
with high immigration and the resulting rapid population growth in the 2000s.
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A Data
Table 1: Data
Variable Source
Consumer Price Index FSO (Prices)
Capital Stock (Nominal) FSO (National Economy)
Capital Stock (Real) FSO (National Economy)
Depreciation Rate Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar and Marcel P.
Timmer (2015), ”The Next Generation of the Penn
World Table” American Economic Review, 105(10),
3150-3182
Employment (full-time
equivalent)
FSO (Industry and Services, Business and Employ-
ment)
GDP Deflator SECO (GDP quarterly estimates)
GDP (Nominal) SECO (GDP quarterly estimates)
GDP (Real) SECO (GDP quarterly estimates)
Gross Value Added United Nations Statistics Division (National Accounts
Estimates of Main Aggregates)
Investment deflator Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar and Marcel P.
Timmer (2015), ”The Next Generation of the Penn
World Table” American Economic Review (Capital
Detail and National Accounts data)
Swiss National Bank (Producer and Import Prices
Statistics)
Labor Share Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar and Marcel P.
Timmer (2015), ”The Next Generation of the Penn
World Table” American Economic Review, 105(10),
3150-3182 (Labor Detail)
OECD (Unit Labor Costs)
Productivity Growth FSO (National Economy)
Risk Free Rate CH FRED Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Risk Free Rate US FRED Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Wage Growth FSO (Work and Income, Wages, Income from Employ-
ment and Labour Costs)
Yield Moody’s Aaa bond
portfolio
FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
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B Specifications
Table 2 gives an overview of all specifications.
Table 2: Specifications Overview
Specification Inflation pi Depreciation rate δ
1 FSO (nominal capital stock / real capital stock) PTW
2 SNB PTW
3 PWT PTW
C Additional Results
Table 3 illustrates the results obtained with all specifications. As it is possible
to see, all specifications led to similar findings. Given the different length of the
series, to make the different results comparable, we represent the change as the
yearly percentage points change. This equals the slope coefficient of the trend
line. Figure 11 shows the plot of the change of the first three specifications.
The other three specifications are not included since the difference is negligible.
Table 3: Yearly Percentage Points Change (Source: See Section 4 and Ap-
pendix A)
Specification
1 2 3 4 5 6
Labor Share(OECD) 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Labor Share (PWT) -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
Required Rate of return -0.24 -0.16 -0.2 -0.22 -0.14 -0.2
Capital Share -0.53 -0.36 -0.46 -0.47 -0.32 -0.47
Factorless Income Share
(OECD)
0.48 0.28 0.35 0.47 0.28 0.35
Factorless Income Share
(PTW)
0.58 0.45 0.54 0.57 0.44 0.52
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Figure 11: Additional Results (Source: See Section 4 and Appendix A)
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